invested more than €100 million in the ESS project, and have recruited about 200 people to work on it. Swedish scientists and others with a stake in the project must pressure ministers to ensure that the funding pledges made by other countries are made legally watertight.
Sweden has near-zero experience of building and hosting big-science labs. Its research-policy system is decentralized and consensus-oriented, and possibly not suited to handing over significant sums to individual projects of this size. The Swedish government has pledged to pay just over one-third of the projected ESS construction cost, but what if that cost increases? Even firm supporters of neutron-scattering science such as the United Kingdom and Germany hesitated for five years after the 2009 site decision before making binding membership pledges. Will project partners be willing to pay more if necessary? If not, then where will Sweden find the cash to meet the shortfall? Analysis of Swedish government spending plans for future years suggests that no contingency funds have been set aside. If the cost of the ESS skyrockets, then the Swedish government might have to cut back in other areas. Existing government investment in the ESS has been financed through a complicated set of funding flows, and the numbers do not always seem to add up. This, too, signals a lack of a long-term plan, and little preparation for unforeseen events and cost increases (see O. Hallonsten Sci. Public Policy http://doi.org/z8m; 2014). Sweden must include a contingency margin in its budget. This has worked previously to minimize risk, for example with the construction of the ESRF in Grenoble, France.
Research policy is always a game of priorities, but big-science projects carry complex risks that must be properly prepared for and managed. Although the European Commission has made some moves to explore how it could establish legal frameworks for such collaborations, as well as helping to plan and set political priorities to make them happen, it is too early to predict the outcome of these efforts. It is unlikely, anyway, that new policies will be put in place in time to benefit the ESS.
The project has already suffered from the indecision of Europe in collaborative big science: while Europe has been discussing and haggling over construction and costs of the ESS, both Japan and the United States have swiftly built and started to operate their own versions. Europe is now playing catch-up. If it is not to fall further behind, then its attitude to big-science projects must change. The current preparations for the ESS are a good place to start. ■
